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AbSTRACT
This paper discusses the question o f the expression o f alterity as “faces” in H erm an M elville’s tw o m asterpieces, M oby-D ick; or,The W hale and Billy Budd, Sailor. 
The issue o f otherness and the relationships betw een subjects stands as a m ajor 
problem  in literature, but also in philosophy and ethics, as it also logically entails a 
questioning about identity and sam eness. The analysis uses the concepts o f face from  
the phenom enological point o f v iew  o f Em m anuel Levinas, but also that o f faciality 
developed b y D eleuze and G uattari in A  Thousand Plateaus. The difficulty, or even 
im possibility to reach the O ther w ho stands as pure exteriority in a nonreciprocal 
relationship leads to a num ber o f com m unication deadlocks, that language itself 
cannot solve as the deadly face-to-face in Billy Budd m akes it clear. The traditional 
vision o f the w estern philosophy o f representation, based on the G reek m odel ruled 
b y  the idea o f the Sam e and identity m ust be therefore left and redefined in order to 
take into account the pure exteriority o f the other.
JK ey words: alterity ; Billy Budd; face; identity Herm an Melville; M oby-Dick; Other.
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The question of alterity and the relationship 
to the Other appears in different ways and in a 
variety of fields, such as art, medicine, anthro­
pology, sociology, psychology, politics, philoso­
phy, theology, ethics, language and literature. 
But whatever the discipline, the evocation of 
alterity immediately entails the question of the 
relationship with the Other, or others, most of­
ten in connection with ethics, even though this 
subject can also be studied through a phenom­
enological approach. This relationship and the 
complex intricacies it causes affects the issue of 
representation, an obviously central point in lit­
erature.
In the major literary texts in which alter­
ity manifests itself, the main question that aris­
es logically is: how can we consider the other? 
The aim of this paper is to explore otherness as 
it appears in two major fictions by H. Melville, 
Moby-Dick (1851) and Billy Budd (published in 
1924), using the philosophy of Emmanuel Levi- 
nas’s works Totality and Infinity -  An Essay on 
externality (1961) and Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence. (1990), as well as the approach 
of G. Deleuze and F. Guattari in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 2: A  Thousand Plateaus (1972). 
The term “face” used for this analysis must be 
unsderstood according to the definition given by 
the two authors in the mentioned works.
1 - F a c ia lity  a n d  o th e rn e ss ; th e  O th e r 
(“A u tr e ” ) a n d  th e  o th e r  (“ a u tr u i” )
The Other is not necessarily an Other, but 
“others” involved in a love/hate relationship As 
Jean-Luc Marion points it, the etymology of the 
term indicates that the other (“Autrui”) derives 
from an alteration of “alter”, in other words, it 
results from the addition of a dative (attribution) 
to the “other”.
But according to Levinas, this is a non-recip­
rocal relationship, where the identity of the sub­
ject, considered as “I” (in the nominative case) 
has to be set in the accusative: in the thought of 
the philosopher, the subject “I “ has to answer 
for the other, which implies a notion of respon­
sibility. The result is a fundamental passivity of 
the subject, who can not “receive” the other from 
a basis it would assume in advance, because it 
is always already called or inspired by the oth­
er. The subject is then in the position of passive 
exposure to others, in a movement in which the
subject who is affected by others builds itself by 
the same assignment. This exposure to Others 
will be referred to as “The Saying without the 
Said” (that is to say below any Said) in Other­
wise than Being or Beyond Essence, a situation 
which seems to correspond to that of Melville’s 
Billy Budd, a character exposed to different faces 
of Others including that of the Master at Arms 
Claggart in the fatal face-to-face.
H o w  d o es  th e  o th e r  m a n ife s t  its e lf?
There are different “names” for the other, 
if indeed it can be named at all. “Face” is one 
of these names ( used by Deleuze, Levinas), or 
“trace” in Otherwise than Being ; it may also be 
called Saying (which then equates “face”, “pas­
sivity”, “diachrony”) vs Said, like writing, syn­
chrony, history, or “trace of God” (the notion of 
“trace” in Derrida, “writing and differance “ was 
inspired by Levinas ). The face is that by which 
we recognize the other, that by which it reveals 
itself to us. It appears as the condition of pos­
sibility of intersubjectivities and should, as such, 
remain visible and legible.
The question of visibility, of “Seeing” must 
then be broached, as well as the issue of inter­
subjectivity.
S e e in g  th e  o th e r
We will start from the concept of “faciality” 
(Deleuze) to study the human face, not as a natu­
ral given, but as a semiotic construction. Face and 
“faciality” affect other concepts, in particular:
1. The “savage”, as an ethical or scientific 
concept, which considers the face as the site of 
a socio-ethical expression, as for instance Moby- 
Dick’s Queequeg, a perfect embodiment of the 
savage for the white narrator Ishmael.
2. Subjectivity, as expressed by the face, as a 
phenomenal evidence of the subjectivity of oth­
ers, and whose relation to subjectivity constitues 
a main issue in XXth century French phenom­
enology. In that case, “face” is not to be regarded 
as a reflection of the soul, nor does it take any 
special meaning.
3. Phenomenality and its limits : Conse­
quently, to what extent can a phenomenon be 
called a “face”? What and/or who can be referred 
to as such ?
I - T h e  id o l a n d  th e  ico n : e id o lo n  v s  ei- 
k o n , M o b y-D ick  a n d  th e  id o la to r
The questions of the Face and of the Other 
inevitably lead to the larger notion of visibility,
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especially when addressing the issue of the ab­
solute Other (“God”) and of the irreducible dis­
tance that characterizes it, which can be called 
exteriority. Visibility and its corollary, vision, 
appear as prominent concepts which in turn in­
volve the central notions of the idol and the icon, 
two crucial yet distinct terms that will be used in 
our study.
The distinction between eidolon and eikon 
stems from etymology: both words are formed 
on the same root, but only eidolon falls within 
the sphere of the visible because it is formed on 
a theme that expresses the idea of seeing (from 
the Greek verb idein “see”, and eidos, the name 
that applies to the first visible appearance). On 
the other hand, eikon relates to the root weik, 
indicating suitability or appropriateness (for in­
stance like the adjective eikelos, “similar”)
The different values of the words clearly lead 
to an opposition between the eidolon, as a copy 
of sensitive appearance, and the eikon, the trans­
position of essence. The eidolon and its model 
rest on the identity of surface and meaning, while 
the relationship between the eikon and what it 
represents lies at the level of the deep structure 
and of the signified.
Tradition has eventually reduced the visible 
eidolon to pure appearance, and thus applies to 
gods that exist only in their image, while eikon is 
reserved for the representations of God (icons). 
So that the Idol finally coresponds to what is 
seen, what is visible; but the divine idol implies 
distance, as J-L Marion remarks: “The idol at­
tempts to bring us close to the divine and to 
appropriate it to us.” [8, P 7j; The idol gives us 
an idolatrous face of God, but this face is man- 
made, in keeping with the human experience of 
the divine, and actually refers to this type of ex­
perience and not to the Being or essence. In oth­
er words the idol aims to reduce the gap and the 
withdrawal of the divine; then the radical oth­
erness, the irreducible exteriority of the other is 
canceled, as the idol eliminates the “irrefutable 
otherness which, properly, attests the divine “ as 
Marion affirms: “The idol lacks the distance that 
identifies and authenticates the divine as such -  
as what does not belong to us but befalls us”. [8, 
PP.7-8 ].
The irreducible distance with the Other en­
tails a number of major issues that affect the 
question of representation in literature, and
Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick specifically de­
votes several chapters to the impossible depic­
tion of the white whale. But at the beginning 
of the monstrous book, chapter 3 “The Spouter 
Inn” already introduces this question, through 
the “wild”, apparently terrifying character of 
Queequeg. This chapter describes the first meet­
ing between Ishmael the narrator (American, 
white and Christian) and the strange barbarian 
whose body is covered with tattoos, and who 
peddles shrunken heads when ashore. Queequeg 
embodies the “savage”, the “pagan”, the Other 
par excellence, and first produces a reaction of 
terror and rejection from the part of Ishmael. 
Forced to share a room, and even his bed with 
that character, the young narrator is already in 
bed, late at night, when Queequeg eventually ar­
rives, and engages in a curious ritual which can 
be described as an “idolatrous ritual”, actually a 
prayer to his dark wooden “idol”:
I  now screwed my eyes hard towards the 
half hidden image, feeling but ill at ease mean- 
time—to see what was next to follow. First he 
takes about a double handful o f shavings out 
o f his grego pocket, and places them carefully 
before the idol; then laying a bit o f ship biscuit 
on top and applying the flam e from  the lamp, 
he kindled the shavings into a sacrificial blaze. 
Presently, after many hasty snatches into the 
fire, and still hastier withdrawals o f his fingers 
(whereby he seemed to be scorching them bad­
ly), he at last succeeded in drawing out the bis­
cuit; then blowing off the heat and ashes a little, 
he made a polite offer o f it to the little negro. 
But the little devil did not seem to fancy such  
dry sort o f fa re at all; he never moved his lips. 
All these strange antics were accompanied by 
still stranger guttural noises from the devotee, 
who seemed to be praying in a sing-song or else 
singing some pagan psalmody or other, during 
which his face twitched about in the most un­
natural manner. A t last extinguishing the fire, 
he took the idol up very unceremoniously, and 
bagged it again in his grego pocket as care­
lessly as i f  he were a sportsman bagging a dead 
woodcock. [10, P. 30j The description points to 
a “strange”, grotesque ritual, in which the “face” 
that appears is that of the human, barbaric and 
wild as it may be, without any distance, in a 
roughness brought by familiarity; as “ the half 
hidden picture “ shows, it is a mere image, a dis-
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torted appearance (“a curious little deformed im­
age “) that Ishmael quickly identifies as “nothing 
but a wooden idol”. Unsurprinsingly, in chapter 
16 the idol becomes a “god” named “Yojo” who 
plays the part of an oracle supposed to guide 
Queequeg in selecting the ship he will embark 
on. Here again, Ishmael humorously underlines 
the comic inadequacy of the relationship be­
tween God and the idol, “ a rather good sort o f  
god, who perhaps meant well enough upon the 
whole, but in all cases did not succeed in his be­
nevolent designs.” [10, P.66]
The essence of the icon is obviously com­
pletely different, but we may wonder what thing 
or being does the icon offer the face of. The Bible 
mentions “ the image of the invisible God” (Who 
is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn 
of every creature”. (Colossians I, 15) The Bible, 
King James Version), a religious icon, i.e the 
representation of a face in which the eyes play a 
prominent part for in that case, it is a face who 
gazes at me, as philosopher Jean-Luc Marion 
states it:
“The icon manifests neither the human face, 
nor the divine nature that no one would be able 
to envisage, but, theologians of the icon would 
say, the relationship of the one to the other (...) 
The icon conceals and reveals that on which it 
is based: the gap between the divine and his 
face.”[8, P.23]
The icon corresponds to the visibility of the 
invisible, a visiblility where the invisible is to be 
seen as such and which definitely does not seek 
to abolish the distance. “The icon properly mani­
fests the nuptial distance that weds, without 
confusing, the visible and the invisible -- that is, 
the human and the divine.” [8, P. 26]
The novel Moby-Dick devotes several chap­
ters to this question (a crucial one in the study of 
the problem of representation), especially when it 
comes to portray (“without brushes or canvas”) 
the mythical monster, and the difficulty- if not 
the impossibility- of this task rapidly appears. 
Starting with the always “approximate”, oblique, 
evocation of the “face” of Moby-Dick (called 
“Sphynx”, “mystic” or “mysterious” in the book) 
the narrator realizes immediately the impossibil­
ity of such representations, mainly because of the 
essential invisibility of the white whale, as whale 
hunting amounts to an attempt to approach the 
alterity and various modes of the other.
Chapters 55 and 56 of Moby-Dick expose 
the impossibility of reaching any satisfactory 
representation, that is to say an iconic one, ca­
pable of conveying the essence of the Same (of 
Moby-Dick, or the Absolute Other). As a matter 
of fact, only erroneous monstrous pictures of the 
Whale have been achieved, as the etymology of 
the Monster seems to imply. It relates to “dem­
onstration”, it shows, but remains within the 
domain of appearance, of the visible, without 
accessing essence, in other words, it remains an 
idol: True, one portrait may hit the mark much 
nearer than another, but none can hit it with 
any very considerable degree o f exactness. So 
there is no earthly way o f finding out precisely 
what the whale really looks like. [10, P.228]
The only way to reach a satisfactory result 
is to experience a physical encounter with the 
monster : “And the only mode in which you can 
derive even a tolerable idea o f his living con­
tour, is by going a whaling yourself; but by so 
doing, you run no small risk o f being eternally 
stove and sunk by him”. [10, P.228]
It is a risky business, whose major danger 
lies in encountering the Other and the Face, de­
liberately or accidentally, as seems to suggest the 
episode of Pip, who survived after falling over­
board during a lowering but whose spirit seems 
disturbed forever after the unfortunate episode. 
After his wreck, Pip has turned into a “fool”, he 
has seen the forbidden “face” of God, becoming 
himself “altered” yet an “idiot” after his contem­
plation, or perhaps revelation “of God-omnipres­
ent” : “He saw God’s fo o t upon the treadle o f the 
loom, and spoke it; and therefore his shipmates 
called him mad. So man’s insanity is heaven’s 
sense; and wandering fr o m  all mortal reason, 
man comes at last to that celestial thought, 
which, to reason, is absurd and frantic; and 
weal or woe, feels then uncompromised, indif­
ferent as his God.” [10, P. 93] (Cf The Bible King 
James Version, Exodus, 33:20:” And he said, 
Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no 
man see me, and live.”)
It seems that Pip faced absolute otherness, 
God in his radical exteriority, in a direct and 
therefore violent encounter with a face which 
brings us back to the thought of E. Levinas in 
Totality and Infinity, where God stands as the 
epitome of the Unreachable Other, and whose 
direct contemplation is impossible.
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Meeting the other face-to-face is the starting 
point of the ethical relationship for E. Levinas. 
This relationship to the Other is in fact a relation 
to the absolutely other, an encounter with an un­
representable face or unknown language.
The other, in his absolute singularity, always 
escapes me: I am “never close enough,” in the 
words of Levinas. The way the other occurs to 
me, escaping me by facing me, is called “face” in 
the philospher’s system.
But thematizing the face, that is to say giving 
him features, means already disfiguring him. Of 
course this face is not limited to aesthetics, to the 
features of the face or to its face. For Levinas, the 
only possible meeting is the encounter with the 
manifestation of the other in the face, but not with 
the other since a direct encounter is impossible : 
“If we could possess, grasp and know each other, 
it would not be another.” [8, P.83]; there would 
not even be any phenomenology of the face, since 
logically there must be first a phenomenon before­
hand. Therefore, if the sperm whale is the Other, 
the “face” should be the face of the whale, consid­
ered as the irreducible Other. And indeed, Moby- 
Dick does not have any proper “features” : “For 
you see no one point precisely; not one distinct 
feature is revealed; no nose, eyes, ears, or mouth; 
no face; he has none, proper (...) [10, P.292]
Any “depiction” or representation is then 
impossible, and nobody ever tried to achieve it, 
as the opening lines of chapter 79 make it clear. 
The sperm whale is definitely an unfathomable 
enigma that no Champollion could decipher, and 
Ishmael’s project may seem somewhat preten­
tious since any attempt to represent the face of 
Whale is doomed to failure.
II - F a cia lity : th e  b e a u tifu l fa c e  o f  th e  
sa v a g e
The notion of “face” leads to that of faciality 
as expressed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guat- 
tari, a concept which in turn involves the notions 
of savage and norm. Deleuze and Guattari pro­
pose a genealogical study of these concepts, so as 
to consider the face not as a phenomenological 
given but as a type of coding of the expressions 
of the human head specific to Western cultures:
“The face is not a universal. It is not even 
that of the white man; it is White Man himself, 
with his broad white cheeks and the black hole 
of his eyes.
The face is Christ. The face is the typical Eu­
ropean, what Ezra Pound called the average sen­
sual man, in short, the ordinary everyday Eroto­
maniac (nineteenth-century psychiatrists were 
right to say that erotomania, unlike nymphoma­
nia, often remains pure and chaste; this is be­
cause it operates through the face and facializa- 
tion). Not a universal, but fades totius universi. 
Jesus Christ superstar: he invented the facializa- 
tion of the entire body and spread it everywhere 
(the Passion of Joan of Arc, in close-up). Thus 
the face is by nature an entirely specific idea, 
which did not preclude its acquiring and exercis­
ing the most general of functions: the function 
of biunivocalization, or binarization. It has two 
aspects: the abstract machine of faciality, inso­
far as it is composed by a black hole/white wall 
system, functions in two ways, one of which con­
cerns the units or elements, the other the choic­
es. Under the first aspect, the black hole acts as 
a central computer, Christ, the third eye that 
moves across the wall or the white screen serving 
as general surface of reference. Regardless of the 
content one gives it, the machine constitutes a 
facial unit, an elementary face in biunivocal rela­
tion with another: it is a man or a woman, a rich 
person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader 
or a subject, “an x or a y.” [2, PP. 176-177]
They re- defined the face as the result of a 
“faciality”, that is to say, the result, historically 
dated, of the meeting of three layers : First, an 
organic level, when a part of the body (here the 
head) makes it signify. Secondly, a signifying 
layer which assigns a specific meaning to the ele­
ments described. Third, a subjective layer, which 
considers the face as the expression of an indi­
vidual consciousness.
However a relation between facial features 
and the signified cannot be denied, and it must 
ne noted that faciality leads to the creation of 
“types”, then to the establishment of standards 
and norms, which in turn may entail a close con­
nection with the political sphere. The arrange­
ment of these three strata is called the “abstract 
machine of faciality” by Deleuze and Guattari.
It seems that Melville’s Moby-Dick somehow 
broaches the issue of “faciality”, more particular­
ly through the evocation of the face of Queequeg 
the “savage”, regarded as an ethical or scientific 
concept. This paradigm considers the face as 
a place of socio-ethical expression which con-
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veys the contrast between the smooth/striated 
spaces and the interplay of territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation. Still according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, the maritime model exposes the 
complex opposition between smooth and stri­
ated spaces : the authors suggest several other 
types, including that of the fabric (i.e. the stri­
ated space) vs the smooth space of felt, an “anti­
fabric” randomly intertwining fibers and defined 
as “in principle infinite”, capable of spreading in 
every direction.
“Felt is a supple solid product that proceeds 
altogether differently, as an anti-fabric. It im­
plies no separation of threads, no intertwining, 
only an entanglement of fibers (...) An aggregate 
of intrication of this kind is in no way homoge­
neous: it is nevertheless smooth, and contrasts 
point by point with the space of fabric (it is in 
principle infinite, open, and unlimited in every 
direction; it has neither top nor bottom nor cen­
ter; it does not assign fixed and mobile elements 
but rather distributes a continuous variation)”. 
[2, P. 476j
Another opposition of concepts associated 
with the technological model of the fabric is also 
mentioned, that of embroidery (striated space) 
and the patchwork (smooth space) so typical of 
American culture. A  similar model appears in 
the text of Melville, especially when the narra­
tor comes to discuss his meeting with the terrify­
ing savage who shares his room at “The Spouter 
Inn” in chapter 3.
The first meeting with the South Sea harpoon- 
er, previously introduced as a head peddler and 
idolatrous pagan lost in the very Christian com­
munity of New Bedford, New England, already re­
flects the opposition : governed by the rules of Pu­
ritan morality and by the laws of the whaling trade 
that sustain it, the highly normalized city consti­
tutes a type of striated space, against which the 
very special “face” of the savage Queequeg stands 
out most conspicuously. Ishmael does not imme­
diately perceive it as such, and the narrator’s long 
waiting in the darkness of the room brutally ends 
with the shock of the sight he finally sees; what he 
discovers is not a “face” properly speaking, it is 
first of all a disconcerting and utterly frightening 
“head”: His bald purplish head now looked fo r  all 
the world like a mildewed skull. [10, P. 28j
According to G. Deleuze, “the head, even the 
human head, is not necessarily a face.” [2, P. 170j
; the concept of face stems from what Deleuze 
calls “the abstract machine of faciality”, that is 
to say an assembling and social production of 
significance corresponding in fact to the western 
face of the white and Christian man: “The face 
is Christ. The face is the typical European”; (...) 
This is a bi-univocalization, or binarization. “[2, 
P. 170j The striating and criss-crossing power of 
faciality is clear; it orders a normality away from 
which all those who cannot be considered as 
Man, White, and Christian constitute a deviance.
At that point in the text, this is indeed what 
Queequeg emblematizes in the eyes of the narra­
tor since the frightening character concentrates 
all the oppositions and deviances that have just 
been mentioned: Christian/pagan; white man/ 
Dark skin; Civilization/Wild; New Bedford/ 
South Seas. The description of the harpooner 
becomes then more accurate, and finally focus­
es on a face that does not meet the standards of 
the white man: it was o f a dark, purplish, yel­
low color, here and there stuck over with large, 
blackish looking squares. (..) They were some 
stains o f some sort or other. [10, P. 28j.
After a moment of surprise, Ishmael realizes 
that the whole body of Queequeg is also covered 
by the same colorful patterns, which he eventual­
ly identifies as tattoos: “ (...) these covered parts 
o f him were checkered with the same squares as 
his face ; his back, too, was all over the sam e  
dark squares(...) Still more, his very legs were 
marked, as if  a  parcel o f dark green frogs were 
running up the trunks o f young palms. It was 
now quite plain that he must be some abomina­
ble savage or other shipped aboard o f a whale­
man in the South seas, and so landed in a Chris­
tian country.” [10, PP. 29-30j
In fact the whole body can be “contaminated” 
by the facialization process, or on the contrary, 
as is the case here, completely deviate from it. 
As Ishmael decides to refuse faciality too, his ap­
preciation of the “cannibal” shifts to a complete 
reversal of his initial impression; the savage now 
becomes “courteous”, “kind” and even “charita­
ble: “ fo r  all his tattooings he was on the whole 
a clean, comely cannibal “, a statement that 
the narrator concludes with a surprising” bet­
ter sleep with a sober cannibal than a drunken 
Christian “. [10, P. 31j
The strange patterns covering Queequeg’s 
body also suggest another smooth space, the
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patchwork model, mentioned by Deleuze in A  
Thousand Plateaus. In Chapter 4, aptly entitled 
“The Counterpane”, Melville ’s fiction associates 
to the savage a patchwork bedspread, specifi­
cally crafted using the technique of “quilt”: “The 
counterpane was o f patchwork, fu ll o f odd little 
parti-coloured squares and triangles ; and this 
arm o f his tattooed all over (...) looked fo r  all the 
world like a strip o f that same patchwork quilt.” 
[10, P.32]
Now, the patchwork, made of “successive 
additions of fabric” is an informal space where 
there is no center; it is “an amorphous collection 
of juxtaposed pieces that can be joined together 
in an infinite number of ways.”[2, P.476]. But 
Queequeg comes to literally merge with the bed­
spread (which also happens to be a quilt), which 
also offers a possibility that there may be neither 
top nor bottom. This shows a high degree of af­
finity with nomadism, as if a smooth space came 
out of a striated space, as if the checkered body, 
striated with tattoos, “de-facialized itself “ before 
opening onto a smooth space, inseparably linked 
to movement, and an onto a rhizomic organiza­
tion in which flux leads to creative lines of deter- 
ritorialization. As Ishmael remarks, Queequeg 
seems bound to change in nature and undergo 
a metamorphosis: “[he] was a creature in the 
transition state -neither caterpillar nor butter­
fly. He was ju st civilized enough to show his out­
landishness in the strangest possible manner.” 
[10, P. 34]
And indeed, Queeequeg appears to be some­
what “strange, “outlandish”, both “barbaric” and 
bizarre. In Chapter 12, devoted to his biography, 
the reader learns that in the eyes of his family, 
his stay in the Christian world makes the savage 
unfit to access an otherwise legitimate throne, 
but the ‘Christian world “does not regard him as 
“civilized “!
As for Ishmael, he decides to take a path 
seemingly opposed to the ethos of the Chris­
tian world he belongs to and adopts the canni­
bal’s hideous face, to which he feels irresistibly 
attracted: “Wild he was ; a very sight o f sights 
to see ; yet I  began to fee l m yself mysteriously 
drawn towards him. And those same things that 
would have repelled most others, they were the 
very magnets that thus drew me. “[10, P. 53].
This concept of faciality also appears in Bil­
ly Budd, through the noticeable and radical al­
teration of the main character : after murdering 
Claggart and being sentenced to death, the young 
“Handsome Sailor “, the former jewel of the Brit­
ish Navy previously and unanimously consid­
ered as innocent and profoundly moral (“The 
moral nature was seldom  out o f keeping with 
the physical m ake”[9, P. 431] radically changes 
status. Indeed, Billy Budd’s perfect indifference 
to the pious words of the Chaplain come to com­
fort him on his last night before the execution, 
results in his “downgrading” to the rank of bar­
barian: “in vain the good Chaplain sought to im­
press the young barbarian with ideas o f death 
akin to those conveyed in the skull, dial, and 
cross-bones on old tombstones; equally futile to 
all appearance were his efforts to bring home to 
him the thought o f salvation and a Saviour.” [9, 
P. 495]. As the young foretopman evinces little -  
if any- of the emotion or decorous behaviour ex­
pected from a White Man/ Christian, it can only 
be because he has become a “savage” : “And this 
sailor-way o f taking clerical discourse is not 
wholly unlike the way in which the pioneer o f  
Christianity fu ll o f transcendent miracles was 
received long ago on tropic isles by any supe­
rior savage so called.” [9, P. 495].
III - B illy  B u d d  o r  th e  im p o s s ib le  c o n ­
fr o n ta tio n
Melville’s last text - posthumously published 
- mainly revolves around the problematic rela­
tionship to the other, which can be addressed 
from the perspective of alterity, as Levinas’s 
analyzes it in Otherwise Than Being. The status 
and definition of the Other need to be clarified 
in this theory : standing as a figure that appears 
in face-to-face encounters, facing the face of the 
other, the other assigns me to responsibility, and 
even persecutes me, a situation that appears to 
be that of the famous “Handsome Sailor” in Mel­
ville’s novella.
The philosophical concept of responsibility 
is designated by Levinas by a noun correspond­
ing to the verb “to answer”, in the double sig­
nificance of “ answering to” and “answering for”. 
Others appeal to me. And it is in response to this 
call that I am me, to the point of existing in the 
accusative : “Here I am”, Levinas says. Exposed 
to the other and to its violence, Billy Budd must 
actually “answer to “ (before “answering for”) 
the other, or rather the face of the Other embod­
ied by the Master at Arms and the Captain of the
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ship in the famous confrontation scene; but first 
the young sailor shows a total inability to speak 
(and therefore to answer), a main expression of 
his passivity conveyed through the typical stut­
ter which afflicts him in the emotionally intense 
situations. In such circumstances, he is abso­
lutely unable to reply and defend himself, which 
leaves him no choice but to kill Claggart during 
the deadly face-to-face of Chapter 19. The Mas­
ter-at-arms appears here as essentially different, 
an irreducible figure of the outside termed as 
“face” by Levinas. It is only with the manifesta­
tion of his face that this irreducible other shows 
his presence in an “epiphany” that Levinas calls 
“face” : Coming from the other side of being, it 
stands as a revelation of an other world, abso­
lutely outside and above me, and above Billy 
Budd. Claggart seems to be here an “outside”, 
an “other”, a threatening face, the stranger with 
whom it is impossible to establish a relationship, 
with whom there is an “infinite distance” never 
reducible to the domain of the same and which 
therefore constitutes an absolute difference : “ In 
speech, it is the outside,that speaks in giving rise 
to speech, and permitting me to speak” Blanchot 
writes [1, P.55 ]
The face of the other definietely appeals to 
Billy Budd, as a subject or “ me” summoned to 
answer and accept this necessary responsibility 
by setting himself in the “accusative”. The deadly 
confrontation between the foretopman and the 
master-at-arms takes on the appearance of a 
conflict between two faces: after ordering Clag- 
gart to “tell this man to his fa ce” what he had just 
heard, Captain Vere is preparing “to scrutinize 
the mutually confronting visages.”[9, P. 476]. 
The phrasing itself implicitly hints at an underly­
ing meaning, as the definition of” confront “giv­
en by the Webster Dictionary suggests, among 
several possible meanings:
1) to face especially in challenge : oppose 
<confront an enemy>
2) to cause to meet : bring face-to-face <con­
front a reader with statistics>
Both meanings expressed by these entries 
suggest the potential but predictable violence 
that will break out in this impossible dialogue. 
The fatal outcome of this face-to-face is hardly 
surprising, since it establishes an admittedly 
impossible connection between the “yet smooth 
face, all but fem inine in purity o f natural com­
plexion  [9, P. 436] of the innocent sailor and 
Claggart’s “remarkable face,” radically differ­
ent from that of Billy and the other mariners 
as chapter 8 makes it clear. The “marked con­
trast between the persons of the twain “ assessed 
in Chapter 13 extends into the crucial scene of 
chapter 19; the distance between the other and 
the foretopman seems to be infinite, yet this dis­
tance is at the same time a presence, albeit a def­
initely different and therefore infinitely “other” 
presence. The face-to-face stages the terrible en­
counter with the other in its immediacy, reveal­
ing in speech an other who goes beyond and ex­
ceeds the young sailor.
But the only “answer” that Billy Budd is able 
to make to the other does not resort to any speech 
or dialogue; as this is impossible, he responds 
with the physical violence of his uncontrolled 
gesture by which, far from shirking from the call 
of the other, Billy Budd really constitutes himself 
as a responsible subject, which entails a change 
in his status from the self in the accusative to a 
“self -  accused I”, following a progression from 
responsibility to identity, and finally to freedom.
Now there can be a language only because 
there is an otherness and a fundamental dif­
ference between speakers; therefore the other 
cannot be on an equal footing, essential to the 
existence of a dialogue, as any true “discourse is 
discourse with God and not with equals”, Levi­
nas declares [6, P. 297]. The absence of this 
distance, which allows communication to take 
place, is a separation which also constitutes a 
protection and makes the immediate inacces­
sible. This confrontation with the other face oc­
curs in the speech that governs the face-to-face: 
in this case, the encounter with the naked and 
immediate presence of the other becomes totally 
irreducible to any measurement, any mediation, 
and my power cannot be satisfied with a partial 
negation; it asserts itself through a much more 
radical affirmation which can lead to death (i.e 
absolute negation). Man facing man has no 
choice but to speak or to kill. In the confined 
space of the captain’s cabin, Billy Budd is facing 
this face of exteriority; summoned by Vere to “ 
speak” to defend himself, the petrified sailor is 
unable to do so and has no alternative but to kill 
the officer. In this terrible encounter where the 
mute protagonist has no other choice, to kill or 
to speak, he also shows a “ passive” exposure to
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the face, or to the other, when facing the face of 
the threatening other.
B illy  B u d d ’s  p a s s io n
One of the main characteristics of this other­
ness is violence, whether immanent (the violence 
of the Same) or transcendent (the violence of the 
other). The violence of Transcendence is never 
perceived from a center, it is always received, or 
suffered. This violence is that of the other, who 
still affects me, an “exteriority” which comes 
from the other, or the others. But the Other is 
very ambivalent, and Billy Budd stands as a sub­
ject exposed to a threatening Other that appears 
either as Justice or murderer.
The Other appears as rather amorphous and 
blurry, for the other who threatens me is not 
only the victim but also the implacable judge 
who threatens m y comfort, or even m y life with 
a death sentence: in Melville’s fiction, it ap­
pears alternately under the features of Captain 
Vere (who will ironically end his career on the 
aptly named “ Atheist”, and for Levinas, atheism 
means separation, an essential requirement for 
the possibility of the Face), of the officers of the 
hastily assembled court martial and of course, of 
the malicious, aggressive enemy Claggart, who 
harbours evil intentions towards Billy Budd. 
Faced with this wickedness of the others, only a 
passivity or undergoing of the subject (that can 
even reach nonsense) m ay be characterized as 
“absolute Patience” [9, P. 111j.
In this relationship of non-reciprocity, 
where the Other is radically different, pointing 
to an “other” proves to be impossible, “ the face 
appears as no one: it must be understood hence­
forth no longer only as superlative phenomenal- 
ity, but as its anonymity; it appears as “no-one,” 
as no individual, as no particular person, in 
short, it neither appears in person nor as a per­
son.” [8, P. 49j
C O N C L U S IO N
The notion of Other that guided our analysis 
varies according to philosophers and writers. In 
the two texts taken from the American literary 
canon, the concepts analysed by Levinas bring 
to the fore what a complete philosophical tradi­
tion had always rejected, i.e. the Other in aid of 
the Same, the Other who, “manifesting itself as 
being, loses its otherness” [3, P.263-j Like the 
various instances of idols in Moby-Dick, alterity 
appears as pure externality, sometimes without
phenomenality, as radically different; the other 
to whom the subject is exposed is also caught in 
an asymmetrical relationship, since he can hard­
ly bear any relation with that irreducible oth­
erness; and yet, the other orders the subject to 
answer. The case of Billy Budd summoned to re­
spond to Claggart definitely shows the subject’s 
passing to the accusative while being persecuted 
by the absolutely other.
Billy Budd’s subjectivity is described as 
“twisted”, crucified, as evidenced by the depic­
tion of his face bearing “ an expression which 
was as a crucifixion to behold” [9, P. 479j. This 
is indeed an ordeal, a “passion” of Billy Budd who 
also experiences the passion of exteriority. The 
Handsome Sailor seems doomed to passivity, 
a term which a semantic shift can change from 
“passion” to “patient passivity”, where patience 
characterizes a passivity close to quietism; but 
there is another kind of “patience”, which eludes 
any formulation and suggests a movement to­
ward the unsurpassable, which says nothing, but 
the being as Being. This is the case of the young 
seaman, who does not utter a word, who never 
protests and nods silently, patiently. This infinite 
passivity, which “goes beyond being” makes him 
an original figure who goes beyond “any form 
explainable.” Billy Budd unquestionably obeys 
a logic that defies comprehension; like Claggart, 
he already appears as “other” in the universe of 
the Bellipotent, a stranger to a world from which 
he stands out: after all, is not Billy “ (...) a sort 
o f upright barbarian” [9, P. 438j belonging to 
one of “those so-called barbarous” communi­
ties “which in all respects stand nearer to un- 
adulterate Nature “? [9, P. 494j. Apparently the 
young seaman can exist only in the suspension 
of his will, his “ascending” flooding the world 
with the clarity of dawn: Billy Budd is an angel, 
as Vere’s remark highlights it : “Struck dead by 
an angel o f God! Yet the angel must hang!” [9, 
P. 478j. An angel, that is to say ayyvAog, a mes­
senger of a transcendent speech in which God is 
the Other itself.
From Moby-Dick to Billy Budd, Melville’s 
fiction shows an evolution similar to that of 
Levinas from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise 
than Being. However the question of otherness, 
of which the concept of face is only one aspect, 
stands as a central issue in the study of literary 
representation: first in terms of narrative and
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storytelling, then in hermeneutics, through the 
notion of trace related to language in the system 
of J.Derrida, a contemporary and friend of Levi- 
nas’s. The desire to get out of oneself towards the 
other is a thought of pure difference which en­
counters a major obstacle in language itself, as 
speech occurs in the space of the Same. Under 
these conditions, how can the other be conceived 
if it does speak only as exteriority, in a space of 
non-alterity?
This seems to imply a rejection of tradition­
al philosophy, and a will to leave the model of 
Greek philosophy, based on the central ideas of 
the one and the same (for Plato, the other is a 
subjectivity that should be reduced, by force if
necessary). The discussion between the purser 
and the surgeon about the strange absence of 
movement points to the inadequacy of the Greek 
thought and model :
“Euthanasia, Mr. Purser, is something like 
your will-power: I  doubt its authenticity as a
scientific term  begging your pardon again.
It is at once imaginative and metaphysical — in 
short, Greek”. [9, P. 499].
In other words, the surgeon’s doubts about 
Greek and its lack of seriousness seems to show 
the need to exit the tradition of Greek philoso­
phy and the overwhelming supremacy of the 
One and the Same.
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